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Abstract 
 
Drawing on Stones’ (2005) strong structuration theory, the paper unfolds why and how the 
key stakeholders of central government accounting in Nepal are involved in the reproduction 
of routinised accounting practices, resisting the externally-propagated changes. Government 
accountants (the agents-in-focus) through their capability to control the budget routines have 
enjoyed a powerful social position in their position–practice relations with the agents-in-
context, i.e. professional accountants and international consultants, higher-level officers and 
administrators, auditors, and politicians. Social position along with historically-imbued 
dispositions and their conduct and context analysis have enabled government accountants to 
strategically exercise their agency. Government accountants have articulated duality and a 
dialectic relation with the agents-in-context, which have resulted in the reproduction of 
everyday accounting practice and the resistance to the World Bank-led reforms, such as 
accrual accounting and, more recently, the Cash-Basis IPSAS. 
 
Keywords: Strong structuration theory; Emerging economies; Government accounting; 
Nepal. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper is meant to generate a nuanced insight into central government accounting 
practices and reforms in emerging economies. In particular, using Stones’ (2005) strong 
structuration theory (SST) as a sensitising device, we have striven to investigate ‘why’ and 
‘how’ the key internal stakeholders of central government accounting in Nepal, including 
government and professional accountants, higher-level officers and administrators, 
international consultants, politicians, and auditors, are involved in the reproduction of 
routinised accounting practices, resisting the externally-propagated changes. We have given 
special attention to government accountants (the agents-in-focus) at different levels of 
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Nepalese administration who share similarities in agency and structures, given their central 
role in mediating accounting practices and changes within the networks of relationships.  
Prior work on government accounting and budgeting in Nepal (Adhikari, Kuruppu, & 
Matilal, 2013; Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2011), as well as in other emerging economies (Harun, 
Peursen, & Eggleton, 2012; Goddard, Assad, Issa, & Malagila, 2016; Lassou & Hopper, 
2016; Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2009), has given much attention to international monetary 
organisations, mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
institutional pressures that these organisations have exerted to instigate reforms. These 
organisations, through their lending activities, technical assistance, and reports on best 
practices, have created a perception that government accounting practice in emerging 
economies is deficient, resulting in weak governance, accountability, and economy (Rahaman 
& Lawrence, 2001; Rahaman, 2010; Hopper, Lassou, & Soobaroyen, 2016). Therefore, 
government accounting reforms lay at the heart of their development discourses about these 
economies, which they argue would be achieved by adopting certain neo-liberal measures 
advocated by the New Public Management (NPM) and the New Public Financial 
Management (NPFM) (Hood, 1995; Guthrie, Olson, & Humphrey, 1999); for instance, 
accrual accounting, participatory budgeting, and International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards (IPSASs) (Neu & OCampo, 2007; Van Helden & Uddin, 2016; Kuruppu et al., 
2016). 
 
The experience of many emerging economies which have, in recent years, undertaken 
reforms in government accounting delineates that such changes have often been 
overshadowed by unintended consequences and failures (Uddin, Gumb, & Kasumba, 2011; 
Goddard et al., 2016). In some emerging economies, reforms have been abandoned as they 
have turned out to be difficult to implement, and, in other cases, they have been adopted but 
not put into practice or proved to be dysfunctional (Andrews, 2012; Adhikari et al., 2013; 
Hopper et al., 2016). For instance, Lassou and Hopper (2016) have in their study of a country 
in Francophone Africa illustrated how a locally-developed government accounting system, 
widely regarded as effective, was abandoned for a French system, which later turned out to 
be problematic in practice. That government accounting reforms have become more a means 
for emerging economies to secure legitimacy at the institutional level rather than for 
improving the existing practice is evident in the extant literature (Adhikari & Mellemvik, 
2011; Harun et al., 2012; Neu et al., 2009). Several reasons have been cited for the failure of 
the ceremonial adoption of externally-proposed government accounting reforms in emerging 
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economies, primarily inadequate planning; poorly grounded reform recipes, i.e. the adoption 
of the one-size-fit approach; a lack of human resources and IT systems; and the intervention 
of consultants (Allen, 2011; Van Helden & Uddin, 2016; Van Helden & Ouda, 2016). 
Corruption has become another dominant factor in recent years making government 
accounting reforms in emerging economies expensive and dysfunctional (Goddard et al., 
2016; Uddin et al., 2011).  
 
With few exceptions (Jack & Kholeif, 2008; Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005), the issues of 
organisational actors (agency) at the ontic (micro) level and the influence that these actors 
can have in making public sector accounting reforms in emerging economies a success or a 
failure have drawn less attention in the literature. For instance, Uddin & Tsamenyi (2005) 
have in their case study of budgetary and other public sector reforms in a Ghanaian state 
enterprise illustrated why such changes were politicised and delayed by internal actors, 
thereby making them unable to serve public interests. In a similar vein, Jack & Kholeif 
(2008) have investigated the implementation and use of Enterprise Resource Planning, an 
information technology system, in an organisation in Egypt, and reported an exploration of 
conflicting beliefs about the role of management accountants. Studies have delineated that 
organisational actors resist the proposed accounting changes that are incompatible with the 
existing practices and structures (Nor-Aziah & Scapens, 2007; Englund et al., 2011; Scapens 
& Roberts, 1993). Such changes lead to structural contradictions and pose organisational 
actors with a threat in pursuing their interests and exercising their power relationships 
(Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). Organisational actors, therefore, tend to maintain the status quo so 
that their vested power and interests are not affected by the outcomes of the reforms. 
 
However, there remains a paucity of research addressing how government accounting 
permeates day-day-day work and the role of active agency and structures in facilitating 
accounting practices and resisting changes. By looking at the central government accounting 
of Nepal, this study aims to make a contribution to the substance of this debate. A striking 
aspect of Nepalese government accounting has been the stability of cash accounting, despite 
several endeavours over the last five decades to implement reforms such as accrual 
accounting and programme budgeting, and, more recently, the Cash-Basis International 
Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS) (Adhikari et al., 2013). This stability in 
accounting has resulted in the Nepalese central government being a prominent research 
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setting to explore the role of agency and structures, factors which play a key role in executing 
accounting practices and changes (Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2011). 
 
As mentioned earlier, we have drawn on Stones’ (2005) SST as a sensitising device to 
investigate why and how the key internal stakeholders of Nepalese government accounting 
are involved in the reproduction of routinised accounting practices and resisting changes. The 
SST is claimed to be the strengthened version of structuration theory contributing to the 
extension of knowledge assembled by prior Giddensian work, which is focused on the duality 
between agents and abstract structures, i.e. significance, legitimation, and domination, 
through the combination of the external and internal aspects of structures (Coad, Jack, & 
Kholeif, 2015, 2016; Harris, Northcott, Elmassri, & Huikku, 2016). The SST-based 
accounting literature argues that the theory has helped accounting researchers overcome the 
Giddens flat and abstract ontology and promote empirical case studies of particular agents 
and structures, where the agents are embedded in a network of position–practice relations at 
different ontological scale (Coad & Glyptis, 2014; Elmassri, Harris, & Carter, 2016; Feeney 
& Pierce, 2016). Coad et al., (2015) state that another strength of strong structuration theory 
(SST) lies in its potential for effective research design for empirical studies so as to generate 
more meaningful insight into the way accounting is implicated in everyday organisational 
life. We argue that the use of SST in this study enables us to focus more on agency and 
outcomes, and to engender a comprehensive understanding of day-to-day government 
accounting practices and reforms in Nepal by unfolding the position–practices of government 
accountants (the agents-in-focus) and their capability of articulating duality and a dialectic of 
relations with other agents (the agents-in-context). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss Stones’ SST and 
its relevance in the study of government accounting practices and reforms in Nepal. The 
research method is outlined in section 3. Section 4 offers a brief overview of the evolution of 
Nepalese public administration and government accounting, and sheds light on the day-to-day 
government accounting practices and the changes proposed. We present our empirical 
findings in Section 5, analysing the social position (external structures) and internal structures 
of government accountants and their agency. The section also demonstrates the multiple 
dialectics of control taking place between government accountants and other agents (the 
agents-in-context), generating resistance to reforms. The final section summarises Nepalese 
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government accounting practices and changes in the light of SST, and offers some concluding 
remarks highlighting the major contributions of the study. 
 
2. Strong structuration theory in accounting research  
 
The use of Giddens’ (1979, 1984) structuration theory (ST) has not been a new tradition in 
interpretive accounting research (see e.g. Englund & Gerdin, 2014). ST concerns the 
interactions between agency and structures. The latter are memory traces embedded in the 
minds of agents in the form of rules and resources. Giddens (1979, 1984) has applied the term 
‘structural modalities’ to incorporate three different types of abstract structures, i.e. 
significance (interpretative schemes), legitimation (norms which sanction certain forms of 
conduct), and domination (the exercise of power), which the actors instantiate when they 
interact with others, and which either enable or constrain their action. Every action therefore 
involves agency and the instantiation of structures forming a duality (Englund et al., 2011; 
Macintosh and Scapens, 1990). Prior structuration-based accounting studies have illustrated 
how this understanding of duality has helped scholars conceptualise accounting as an 
organisational and social practice and theorise both accounting continuity and change 
(Englund, Gerdin, & Burns, 2011). Although the use of ST is more evident within the domain 
of management accounting in private enterprises (Englund and Gerdin, 2014), public sector 
accounting researchers have drawn on the theory to explore reforms taking place, mainly in 
western countries (Conrad, 2005; Seal & Ball, 2011; Moore, 2013; Lawrence, Alam, 
Northcott, & Lowe, 1997), as well as in emerging economies (Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005).  
 
ST is not, however, without criticism and certain elements of the theory are claimed to be 
underdeveloped (Stones, 2005; Stones & Jack, 2016; Coad et al., 2015; Coad et al., 2016; 
Greenhalgh, Stones, & Swinglehurst, 2014). Englund et al. (2011) state that this is perhaps 
not surprising as Giddens himself (1984, p. 327) has stated that “the concepts of ST should for 
many research purposes be regarded as sensitizing devices, nothing more”. Critics of ST 
mainly focused on the fact that there is an overemphasis on the relatively abstract (macro-
level) analysis of the structures of signification, legitimation, and domination, as well as the 
adoption of high-level institutional analysis, often neglecting the role of agency in the duality 
of structure (Coad et al., 2015; Harris et al., 2016; Makrygisnnakis & Jack, 2016). More 
importantly, the role of external structure, which is represented by position–practice relations 
and which plays a central role in the conceptualisation of the link between structures and 
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agencies at the meso and ontic levels, has been claimed to have been downplayed both in the 
theory and in the extant structuration-based accounting literature (Stones, 2005; Cohen, 
1989). The majority of ST-inspired studies have therefore appeared weak in terms of 
empirically revealing the impact of power embedded in ‘structure-agent’ relationships 
(Elamassri et al., 20160) and of explaining ‘how’ knowledgeable agents draw upon and 
reproduce the structures (accounting structures) in specific settings (Conrad, 2005; Englund 
et al., 2011). The need to exploit structuration theory’s full potential by unfolding how 
agency is implicated in the structuration process is called on in recent studies (Englund & 
Gerdin, 2014). 
 
The emergence of strong structuration theory (SST) (Stones, 2005) is envisaged as an attempt 
to address some of these perceived limitations of Giddens’ structuration theory and to offer a 
new lease of life to the structuration process (Coad et al., 2015; Stones & Jack, 2016). 
Accounting studies drawing on the SST have significantly increased in recent years covering 
areas and events as diverse as strategic investment decision-making (SIDM) (Elmassri et al., 
2016), the implementation of an information technology system (Jack & Kholeif, 2008), new 
product development (Feeney & Pierce, 2016), the 2008 financial crisis (Makrygiannakis & 
Jack, 2016), carbon pricing (Moore & McPhail, 2014), and power struggles between 
engineers and accountants (Coad & Herbert, 2009). Harris et al. (2016) have argued in their 
reanalysis of four cases of SIDM – which were previously drawn from other theories, for 
instance grounded, actor-network, practice and personal construct theories – that SST is 
better suited than those other theories in terms of unfolding complex processes of human 
interaction and of generating additional insights into SIDM. In recent SST-based studies, a 
call has been made for the use of theory in the specific settings of emerging economies, 
predicating its potential usefulness in offering an understanding of externally-proposed 
accounting reforms and the challenges that these reforms may face in the process of 
implementation (Coad et al., 2015). The public sector is especially emphasised given the 
existence of multiple stakeholders who are situated within a web of position-practice relations 
at varied ontological scales, and who have some sort of interest in day-to-day accounting 
practice (Coad et al., 2016). In this paper, we have attempted to address this concern through 
a study of government accounting practices and reforms in Nepal. 
 
The SST emphasises that an understanding of a particular social phenomenon in a particular 
time and place can only be achieved by focusing on the ‘in-situ’ process of structuration and 
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undertaking empirical studies of particular agents and structures at the ontic level - the level 
at which empirical can be sought  (Stones, 2005; Harris et al., 2016; Coad et al., 2016). A key 
aspect of SST, which differentiates it from Giddens’ structuration theory, has been its 
endeavour to bring the role of agency to the foreground of the structuration process through 
the agents’ conduct and context analysis (Coad et al., 2015). This is also claimed to be an 
attempt at rectifying the limitations of Giddens’ methodological bracketing. However, Stones 
(2005) states that this requires researchers to pay particular attention to research design by 
first locating the agents-in-focus and identifying and analysing their structures. Although the 
duality of structure has remained at the heart of SST, Stones (2005) asserts that duality is best 
understood through analysis of a quadripartite framework, which consists of four 
analytically-distinct components consisting external structures, internal structures within the 
agents, active agency, and outcomes.  
 
External structures – the first component of the quadripartite framework – provide the agents 
with their conditions of action. The external structures are mediated largely through position–
practices (Stones, 2005). A position–practice is a social position, its associated identity and 
practice, and the network of social relations that constitute various institutional reciprocities 
and asymmetric power relations (Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010). Coad et al. (2015) state that 
the way Stones has conceptualised ‘position’ can be reconciled with the idea of Giddens 
(1984) in that it provides an incumbent actor with a social identity with a range of 
prerogatives, capabilities, resources, norms, and obligations. Position–practices are enacted 
and perpetuated by active agents within the network of relationships. An understanding of 
position–practice relations therefore enables the researchers to tease out how different actors 
battle against others to gain and maintain legitimacy. For instance, Coad & Glyptis (2014) 
have deployed a position–practice perspective with its four interrelated elements, i.e. praxis, 
positioning, capabilities, and trust, to unfold the management and control of a joint venture 
between companies engaged in the production and shipment of oil and petroleum products.  
 
Greenhalgh & Stones (2010, p. 70) mention that during the structuration process, the agents 
draw upon their internal structures which are further analytically divided into general 
dispositions (i.e. socio-cultural schemas, discourses and world-views, moral principles, 
attitudes, ambitions, skills, and personal value commitments) and conjuncturally-specific 
knowledge of the strategic terrain and ‘how one is expected to act within it, based on one’s 
hermeneutic understanding of external structures’. Active agency implies the way in which 
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agents draw on their internal structures and use their knowledge and understanding of 
external structures (Coad & Herbert, 2009). Stones (2005) states that the agents’ knowledge 
of how they might be expected to act and of the rewards and sanctions likely to follow from 
their actions correspond to Giddens’s widely cited (but highly abstract) terminologies: 
interpretative schemas (structures of signification), normative expectations (structures of 
legitimation), and a capability to mobilise authority and resources (structures of domination). 
The last element of the quadripartite framework, i.e. outcomes, can be intended or unintended 
feedback on both external and internal structures, either preserving them faithfully or 
changing them as they are enacted (Greenhalgh & Stones 2010; Coad et al., 2015).  
 
That SST has provided additional insights into active agency in the duality and outcomes are 
evident in recent work (Moore & McPhail, 2016; Feeney & Pierce, 2016; Elmassri et al., 
2016; Makrygiannakis & Jack, 2016). However, Coad et al., (2016) state that accounting 
researchers are yet to fully exploit the potential of SST by moving beyond an overly static use 
of the quadripartite framework to the agent’s conduct and context analysis. It is argued that 
such an analysis would help researchers to explore the relational power of agent position-
practice and better interpret the dialectics of control (Harris et al., 2016). The present study 
therefore adds to the existing SST-based accounting literature by focusing on government 
accountants (the agents-in-focus) and bringing out their perceptions and understanding of 
other agents in the articulation of a dialectic relationship. Given the fact that government 
accounting in Nepal has remained stable in the last five decades, we have paid more attention 
to unfolding the dialectic of control in terms of resistance.  
 
Jack & Kholeif (2008) argue that by conceptualising position–practice relationships, external 
structures as a condition of action, and the ability of agents to do otherwise and unintended 
consequences, SST has offered a renewed way of interpreting the dialectic of control in terms 
of resistance. In his strong structuration theory, Stones (2005) has clarified that for generating 
a resistance, the agents (the agents-in-focus) must possess three types of property, which 
include perceived power or capability in relation to other actors, adequate knowledge of 
relevant external structures, including alternative avenues of possibility, and an ability to gain 
requisite reflective distance from their conditions of action. The extent to which the agent 
possesses these three properties, if all other things remain equal, determines his or her ability 
to regulate, modulate, reflect, and erase specific aspects of external demands and pressures. 
With the exception of Jack & Kholeif (2008), we are not aware of any studies in accounting 
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that have empirically applied the dialectic of control in terms of resistance to investigate the 
ways in which accounting practices are reproduced, rejecting the external requirements and 
pressures for articulating changes. This has been another area within SST where the 
contribution of prior work is limited (Harris et al., 2016). In this regard, the use of SST is 
valuable in our study not only to generate a nuanced picture of everyday government 
accounting in Nepal at the ontic level, but also to theorise how the resistance to externally-
propagated changes is being executed in the dialectic relationships. In addition, the present 
study responds to the call that the recent SST-based studies have made to further extend the 
emerging stream of SST by empirically unpacking both the reasons and manners through 
which the stability in accounting practice is maintained in emerging economies (Coad et al., 
2016; Coad et al., 2015). 
 
3. Research method  
 
Our research design reflects what Pawson & Tilley (1997) and Makrygiannakis & Jack 
(2016) have mentioned as a ‘circular design’ in that we have applied the SST to explore day-
to-day government accounting in Nepal at the ontic level, and at the same time striven to 
further extend an element of theory (i.e. the dialectic of control in term of resistance) using 
the empirical data. The data for the study are derived from two main sources: document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. Initially, we reviewed the main normative sources 
articulating day-to-day government accounting practices and regulating government 
accountants, i.e. the 2007 Financial Procedures Rules (FPR), the 1999 Financial 
Administration Rules (FAR), and the 1993 Civil Service Rules (CSR) (with the third 
amendment of 2011) (Government of Nepal, 1999; 2007; 2011). At the next stage, we 
reviewed reports issued by government agencies and international organisations discussing 
various aspects of Nepalese central government accounting practice and recommending 
changes. This initial documentary analysis helped us not only generate an understanding of 
Nepalese government accounting norms and practices, ongoing changes, and the position–
practices of government accountants and other stakeholders, but also construct a necessary 
background for selecting our interviewees. 
 
As stated earlier, the SST advocates the design of research data collection through the agent’s 
conduct and context analysis (Coad et al., 2015 and 2016). While the former examines an 
agent’s internal knowledgeability based on disposition and conjuncture, the latter is meant for 
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the analysis of an agent’s external terrain and institutional position–practices (Stones, 2005). 
The SST is predicated on the assumption that the combination of context and conduct 
analysis enables accounting researchers to explore the interaction between the external terrain 
and the agent’s internal knowledgeability, an understanding of which is reckoned to be 
paramount to engender insights into everyday accounting practices (Feeney & Pierce, 2016). 
The identification of agents, both the agents-in-focus and agents-in-context, is therefore 
reckoned to be an initial step while drawing on the SST. Government accountants at different 
hierarchies are our ‘agents-in-focus’, given that they are the key players in the articulation of 
accounting practices and changes. The criterion for selecting government accountants for the 
interviews has been either their experience in everyday accounting practices or their 
involvement in the negotiation and implementation of accounting changes. One of the 
authors’ previous employments in a Nepalese government entity, as well as his engagement 
with government accounting as a consultant, proved valuable in the establishment of initial 
contacts with some government accountants, who, in turn, helped us gain access to other 
accountants, as well as the agents-in-context. In particular, government accountants we 
interviewed included joint comptrollers (first-class or higher-level officers/administrators), 
senior and junior government accountants (i.e. gazetted or officer-level accountants), and 
non-gazetted government accountants (i.e. non-officer level accountants) at the Financial 
Comptroller General Office (FCGO) and the Financial Administration Division (FAD) of 
various ministries (mainly the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of Education (MoE), 
and the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD)). 
 
The SST states that an agent’s understanding of conditions of action is informed by the 
conjuncturally-specific knowledge of networked others (Stones, 2005). This also manifests 
that interviews with other stakeholders (the agents-in-context) are equally important so as to 
generate a depth of the structuration process surrounding the agents-in-focus (Harris et al., 
2016). The agents-in-contexts’ ability to influence the hermeneutic frames and strategic 
conduct of the agents-in-focus are also reckoned to be evidence of the dialectic of control. 
Our agents-in-context in the present study include joint secretaries (first-class or higher-level 
officers/administrators) and officers (administrators/under-secretaries/bureaucrats) at the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the above-mentioned ministries; senior and junior auditors at 
the Auditor General’s Office (AGO); and professional accountants (chartered accountants) at 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nepal (ICAN) and the Accounting Standards Board 
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(ASB), some of whom had also served in the past as a consultant of international 
organisations (see Appendix A).  
 
One of the authors visited Kathmandu, Nepal, during March/April 2014 and conducted 40 
semi-structured interviews. The interviews conducted in the Nepalese language lasted an 
average of an hour and a half with each participant. All interviews were recorded and 
subsequently transcribed. Government accounting in emerging countries is conceived of as 
being a politically sensitive area given that it deals with governments’ incomes and expenses 
and the way accountability is discharged (Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2011; Lassou & Hopper, 
2016). Recognising the political sensitivity of the topic, government accountants, as well as 
other stakeholders of government accounting, are often hesitant to answer the structured 
questions due to fear and a lack of trust (Adhikari et al., 2013). Having realised this, we 
assured our interviewees prior to the interviews that their anonymity would be maintained. 
Next, we started our interviews both to the agents-in-focus and the agents-in-context by 
presenting open-ended questions raising concerns over their social position, prerogatives, and 
obligations; objectives and purposes of government accounting; day-to-day government 
accounting practices and reforms; and the interactions between them in facilitating day-to-
day accounting practices and implementing reforms. We articulated interviews more as free-
flowing conversations allowing respondents to focus on any aspect(s) within the issues we 
raised to them. However, based on the feedback and the engagement of the informants, we 
attempted to be more specific as the interviews flowed. For instance, we raised concerns 
particularly to government accountants (the agents-in-focus) about how they perceive and 
understand everyday accounting practice (knowledgeability) and the basis of their active 
agency. This helped us to conceptualise their internal knowledgeability and awareness of 
their external terrain, both of which we argue were paramount in elucidating why accounting 
is produced and reproduced in everyday life. We also discussed both with government 
accountants and the agents-in-context their preference and priority in government accounting, 
the way they interact with each other, and the extent they are aware of the conduct and 
context of each other, as part of understanding how they are articulating the duality and 
dialectic relationships.  
 
We had the opportunity to reinterview five government accountants during our data 
collection for another project in Kathmandu in August 2015 (Appendix A). We used these 
interviews to clarify issues that had remained ambivalent during our first round of interviews, 
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as well as to ensure the reliability and validity of our findings. At the final stage, we analysed 
our data using the ‘template analysis’ (King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 2004). We noted 
down the views and issues frequently expressed by our interviewees. Attempts were made to 
match them with the evidence gathered through the literature search. We then developed a list 
of codes (or a template) representing the four elements of the quadripartite framework. The 
data representing the themes were then clustered. At the next stage, we endeavoured to 
establish a link between the themes so as to create narratives, the significance of which is 
particularly emphasised in the examination of structure and agency (Pozzebon & 
Pinsonneault, 2005). As stated by Jack & Kholeif (2008), we have presented our case in a 
narrative form interpreting the day-to-day practices of government accountants and the 
network of relationships between them and other administrators at different hierarchies, 
auditors, consultants, politicians, and professional accounting leading to a situation of duality, 
dialectics, and resistance.  
 
4. The Nepalese government accounting context, practice, and reforms 
 
Public sector organisations are operating differently in emerging countries due to their unique 
historical, cultural, and political circumstances (Alawattage, Hooper, & Wickramasinghe, 
2007). Such circumstances have a profound impact on the way accounting is implicated in 
everyday life and the reforms are articulated (Van Helden & Uddin, 2016). Adhikari & 
Mellemvik (2009) argue that Nepalese public administration and accounting have been 
structured distinctly and more traditionally, as compared with many other emerging 
economies, due to Nepal’s non-colonial history. In the following two sub-sections, we 
discuss the evolution of public administration and government accounting in Nepal and shed 
light on the day-to-day government accounting practices and the changes proposed over time. 
 
 4.1. Public administration, bureaucracy and government accounting in the context of 
dictatorship and political patronage 
 
Nepal was established as a country in 1769 with the unification of more than 50 small 
scattered kingdoms. The country was under the family dictatorship of Ranas (one of the 
castes in Nepal) from 1846 until 1950. The Rana rulers had maintained stringent control in 
public administration, and any defaults in public funds or errors in accounting were the 
responsibility, not only of the defaulters, but also of their heirs up to the seventh generation 
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(Gongal, 1973). The control mechanisms imposed by the Rana rulers had led the 
administrators and accountants to live and perform under fear. They tended to shift their 
personal responsibilities to others, mainly to higher-level officers, and avoided undertaking 
any decisions that might have repercussions to their positions for the sake of their family 
members’ security (Dix, 2011). 
 
Nepalese scholars have mentioned that the country was in a medieval era when it was 
liberated from the Rana families in 1950 (Shrestha, 1965; Joshi, 1973). While other 
neighbouring countries, for instance, India and Sri Lanka, who had been under the British 
Empire, as well as other colonies in Asia, for instance, Cambodia and Fiji, had already 
established an accounting profession, board, and system (Verma & Gray, 2009; Wijewardena 
& Yapa, 1998; Yapa, Jacobs, & Huot, 2016), Nepal was without any state institutions such as 
ministries, governance tools (for example, the budget and accounting systems), and the 
regulations for recruiting administrators and accountants (Adhikari et al., 2013; Goodall, 
1963, 1975). Rose & Landau (1977) state that a dearth of resources, both technical and 
human, and infrastructure led Nepal to become dependent on international organisations and 
development agencies much earlier than many emerging or neighbouring countries in 
pursuing its development and modernisation initiatives. 
 
During the first few years of the 1950s, Indian advisors helped Nepal to set up state 
institutions such as ministries and the Public Service Commission (PSC) (Joshi, 1973). 
Adhikari & Mellemvik (2009) state that the United Nations (UN) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) had prioritised government accounting 
changes to track the progress of development expenditures, which they had offered in the 
form of grants and aid. In 1962, cash accounting was introduced in the country with the 
financial and technical assistance of these two organisations (Chatterjee, 1967). Sharma 
(1996) mentions that government accounting was, however, recognised as a separate 
discipline in Nepal only after the establishment of the FCGO in 1974. The FCGO was 
provided with the status of an independent organ for government accounting and was 
delegated all accounting-related tasks that were previously handled by the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF); for instance, disbursing budget to all spending entities, conducting internal 
audits, tracking foreign aid, grants, and loans, and consolidating the accounting statements. 
The office was termed the ‘District Treasury Comptroller Office’ (DTCO) at the district 
levels (Sharma, 2002). 
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The operation of the FCGO had a profound impact on the position–practices of government 
accountants and setting up their conjuncturally-specific knowledge and active agency. 
Government accountants were then separated from other administrators and brought under 
the jurisdiction of the FCGO (Agrawal & Bista, 1981). In this way, a distinct accounting 
group was constructed within the FCGO accommodating government accountants who were 
at different levels, i.e. gazetted level (officer-level) and non-gazetted level (non-officer level), 
and in different hierarchies. This organisation and classification of government accountants 
still prevails in the country today (PSC, 2007). There are two hierarchies within the gazetted-
level accountants, i.e. senior and junior accountants, and the non-gazetted accountants are 
ranked as first-, second-, third-, and fourth-class accountants. The Public Service 
Commission (PSC) is an assigned body to recruit government accountants at all these levels. 
An undergraduate degree in any of the three disciplines of commerce, accounting, or 
economics is a minimum requisite for the senior and junior accountants. The non-gazetted 
accountants are required to complete their higher secondary school education. More 
interestingly, government accountants are prohibited to leave the group and alter their 
position until and unless they are promoted to a first-class officer (a higher-level 
officer/administrator), a topmost position in Nepalese pubic administration (GoN, 2015). The 
fact that government accountants are often confined to their own group (i.e. social system) 
with distinct social positions (i.e. budget executers/controllers) has led to the development of 
a high degree of trust (social capital) between them, which is, in the strong structuration-
inspired literature, reckoned to be a constitutive aspect of position–practice relations (Coad & 
Glyptis, 2014; Moore & McPhail, 2016). 
 
Nepalese scholars argue that the administrative culture founded on the Ranas’ feudal 
traditions, and its key features such as risk aversion, decision avoidance and red-tapism has 
continued to dominate the general dispositions and agency of Nepalese government 
accountants and administrators (Hachhethu, 2009; Acarya, 2011; Shakya, 2009). Mentions 
are made that the new government appointees tend to adjust their actions to underpin such 
established dispositions and taken-for-granted routines rather than exert any efforts to alter or 
modify them (Dhakal, 2007; Pokharel, 2011). Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, the 
operation of public administration has been further exacerbated due to over-politicisation. All 
issues relating to the appointment and promotion of administrators and accountants are now 
based on their proximity to political parties and their sister trade organisations (Pokharel, 
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2011; Acharya, 2011). Furthermore, a low pay scale and rampant political corruption have 
resulted in the erosion of morale and innovativeness in the Nepalese public administration 
(Dix, 2011; World Bank, 2002). Claims have been made that the Nepalese administrators and 
accountants have become even more conservative than the citizens and politicians, and that 
the implementation of many administrative reforms have turned out to be futile given their 
concerns over maintaining the status quo (Shakya, 2009; Dix, 2011; Pokharel, 2013). The 
historical and structural construction of active agency is therefore reckoned to be different in 
Nepal compared to many other emerging economies. 
 
4.2. Government accounting practices and proposed reforms 
 
Adhikari et al. (2013) argue that the fundamental objective of Nepalese government 
accounting and the way government accountants are structured and mobilised have remained 
intact over the last few decades. Recent changes that have occurred in government accounting 
are confined to extending the regulations rather than putting those rules into practice. There 
are now new provisions annexed to the regulations for cost estimation, asset registration, and 
result demonstration. The main concern of government entities has been to execute the 
budget and maintain budgetary limits, as set out by their ministries concerned and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF). Rewards and sanctions to government accountants are based on 
their capacity to spend the allocated budget and control overspending (World Bank, 2002; 
GoN, 2011, 2015). The prevailing hierarchical structure for government accounting in which 
government entities are scrutinised and consolidated at different levels is, for instance, an 
indication of the emphasis being placed on budget execution and control (Adhikari & 
Mellemvik, 2011). 
 
In practice, Nepalese central government accounting includes three levels: operating-, 
central-, and district-level accounting (see Figure 1). Each government entity entitled to 
budgetary support is required to furnish operating-level accounting, which commences by 
preparing the journal vouchers and ledgers, primarily the cash book and the budget sheet. 
Government entities are required to forward their monthly and annual accounts to the 
respective departments, line ministries, and district treasuries (DTCOs). The next level is 
central-level accounting for ministries and departments. These central-level agencies are 
required to examine the allocated budget and accounts of their subordinate entities and 
prepare a ministerial-level consolidated statement. It is, however, claimed that the 
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significance of central-level accounting has continually withered since the operation of the 
DTCOs (World Bank, 2002). The fact that the DTCOs are authorised to release budget 
allocations to spending units within their jurisdictions has weakened the line ministries’ 
capacity to exercise control over their subordinated units, and, in many cases, they only 
receive an annual report from their subordinated units, even though the regulations require 
the spending units to forward both the monthly and annual budget reports to their line 
ministries. Along with the ministries, the district treasuries (DTCOs) are required to maintain 
district-level accounting, which is concerned with collecting monthly accounts of spending 
units under their jurisdiction, facilitating internal auditing, and preparing monthly and annual 
consolidated statements for the district as a whole. Such district statements are to be 
forwarded to the FCGO and line ministries on a monthly and annual basis. Figure 1 depicts 
the day-to-day government accounting practices in the Nepalese central government. 
 
Figure 1: Government accounting practice in Nepal 
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Similar to other emerging economies (Allen, 2009; Lassou and Hopper, 2016; Goddard et al., 
2016), Nepal has been attempting to adopt the World Bank-led government accounting 
reforms since the 1980s (Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2011). Accounting measures such as accrual 
accounting and programme budgeting were predicated during the initial years on the 
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assumption that these measures would help the country improve planning and expenditure 
management and discharge wider accountability (World Bank, 2002; ADB, 2005; IMF, 
2007). There is no evidence, however, that these reforms have proved successful (Adhikari et 
al., 2013). Since 2007, the World Bank has, however, prioritised the use of the Cash-Basis 
IPSAS before any move towards accrual accounting is undertaken (World Bank, 2007, 2010). 
 
A number of efforts have been made in the last few years to embrace the Cash-Basis IPSAS 
within the Nepalese budgetary entities (ADB, 2011; World Bank, 2011). For instance, the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) – an independent institution to pronounce accounting 
standards for private enterprises – has been assigned with the task of developing a set of 
Nepal Public Sector Accounting Standards (NPSASs) that correspond to the Cash-Basis 
IPSAS. In addition, a separate unit, the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(PEFA), has been established within the FCGO to coordinate the implementation of public 
finance reforms, including the Cash-Basis IPSAS (ASB, 2009). More recently, the IPSAS 
project has been included in the multi-donor trust fund, chaired by the World Bank, as a 
priority project. The whole idea behind the trust is to consolidate the donors’ fund into a 
single account and to use it in those projects/reforms that contribute to infrastructure 
development and governance changes. Despite such efforts, the implementation of the Cash-
Basis IPSAS in budgetary entities has proved far more complex than first thought leading to a 
substantial delay in its adoption (MoF, 2012, 2014, 2015; FCGO, 2015). Similar to other 
emerging economies (Parry & Wynne, 2009; World Bank, 2010; IFAC, 2010), there are 
several technical ambiguities envisaged in the implementation of the standard in budgetary 
entities; for instance, the preparation of full consolidation, the reporting of external 
assistance, and third-party payments. However, a key challenge in the adoption of the 
standard in Nepal has been to alter the routine behaviour and agency of government 
accountants and administrators, and to restructure the way in which the day-to-day 
accounting practice is taking shape (GoN, 2015). 
 
5. Empirical analysis and discussion  
 
This section, which is based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews, illustrates 
why and how central government accounting practice is reproduced in Nepal. At the outset, 
we demonstrate the structures of government accountants (the agents-in-focus), which shed 
light on the reasons for the reproduction of everyday government accounting practices. We 
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have a particular focus on the agency and outcomes, areas in which there is envisaged a scope 
for the further extension of the SST (Feeney & Pierce, 2016). We provide an in-depth 
analysis of the position–practice relations between government accountants and the agents-in-
context, and delineate how these different agents with varied conduct and context are battling 
against others through the dialectic of control to maintain their interests, and how the day-to-
day accounting practice is implicated in this process while resisting the proposed changes. 
 
5.1. Structures external to government accountants (the agents-in-focus)  
 
External structures, which involve position–practices and their networked relations, provide 
agents with a social identity with a range of prerogatives, capabilities, norms, resources, and 
obligations (Stones, 2005; Giddens, 1984). The social position of government accountants 
(the agents-in-focus) and their social identity are distinct in Nepal from other public 
administrators. Government accountants, who are organised and mobilised separately by the 
FCGO, have inherited a range of prerogatives and obligations relating to the articulation of 
financial/budget management and the discharging of accountability. We have in our study 
identified several clusters of actors who have position–practice relations with the agents-in-
focus (i.e. government accountants). These clusters of actors (the agents-in-context) include 
higher-level officers (first-class officers) at the FCGO and ministries, administrators, auditors 
at the Auditor General’s Office, international consultants, politicians, and professional 
accountants at the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nepal (ICAN) and the Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB). All of these actors have a stake in government accounting, although 
they hold different positions in their specific field and have varied prerogatives, obligations, 
and reactions with regard to budget and accounting changes. Figure 2 depicts the position–
practice relations of government accountants with these agents-in-context. 
 
Figure 2: Position-practice relations in Nepalese central government accounting 
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Altogether there are more than 5,000 government accountants under the jurisdiction of the 
FCGO, who are scattered across budgetary entities. In each ministry/department, a Financial 
Administration Division (FAD) exists, which is chaired by a senior accountant and consists 
of a cadre of junior and non-gazetted accountants. This division is seen more as a unit of the 
FCGO within the ministry. The fact that all financial and budget-related activities are 
facilitated through this division has led to a situation of resource or power asymmetries 
between this and other divisions within the ministry. This has often resulted in a hostile 
relationship between the FAD and other divisions, which is evident in the following 
statement of one senior accountant at the FCGO: 
“We [the government accountants] feel treated like outsiders in the ministries. Often the 
ministerial decisions are made without involving representatives from the Financial 
Administration Division. We have budget information, so they are scared of us. We are 
told of the decisions only after they are approved, so that we would not be able to 
change them or to demonstrate obstacles in their implementation”. 
 
21 
 
Not only have the social positions provided the accountants with power asymmetries over 
resources (budget), but have on many occasions imposed a degree of constraints in their 
everyday work. The system of dual control imposed upon government accountants serves as 
an example (Agrawal & Bista, 1981). Unlike the case of other administrators who are 
accountable to their concerned ministries, government accountants discharge their 
accountability, not only to the FCGO, but also to the Secretary of the ministry in which they 
are assigned to serve. The authority of the Secretary and the Financial Comptroller in 
regulating government accountants is explicitly codified in the 2007 Financial Administration 
Rules (FAR) (GoN, 2007). For instance, the Secretary is designated a ‘Chief Accounting 
Officer’ and is tasked with overseeing authority over financial operations within the 
respective ministry. In addition, the Secretary is required to undertake an annual performance 
appraisal of the head of the Financial Administration Division (FAD) and approve the 
appraisal of junior and non-gazetted accountants, which is the prerogative of the head of the 
FAD. Based on the regulations (GoN, 2007, 2008), such a performance appraisal, which 
takes place in the ministry, is supposed to provide the FCGO with a basis for deciding on the 
promotion, transfer, and capacity development of government accountants. Sharma (1996) 
states that this system of dual control introduced in the 1970s was actually meant to provide 
an additional safeguard to public money rather than to control government accountants. Over 
time, the system has become more a means of avoiding the accountants to exploit power or 
resource asymmetries, which they have inherited through their access to the budget. The 
following statement made by an administrator at the Ministry of Education (MoE) is evidence 
of the undermining of personal trust between government accountants and administrators 
evolved by their social position: 
“If they [the accountants] do not release the allocated budget in a timely manner, we 
can approach the Secretary, who may consider this behaviour in their performance 
evaluation.” 
 
Social positions of government accountants have become a cause instigating power struggles 
between them and other administrators in everyday accounting. Government accountants’ 
disposition and conjuncturally-specific knowledge of their strategic terrain and the conduct of 
the agents-in-context have however led them to become a dominant player in this power 
struggle within the network of relationships. 
 
5.2. Government accountants (the agents-in-focus) and internal structures  
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Internal structures represent government accountants’ (the agents-in-focus) general 
dispositions and the conjuncturally-specific understanding of their structural surroundings. 
The FCGO, since its establishment in 1974, has had a profound impact on the position–
practices of government accountants and setting up their dispositions and conjuncturally-
specific structures. Government accountants share similar socialisation processes and are 
adopting their practices based on the expected reactions of the agents-in-context, which 
mainly concern budget implementation and compliance. The budget has become an important 
tool and an established practice in the Nepalese public administration since the 1950s through 
which to articulate communication, exercise power, and impose sanctions. We observed 
during the interviews that a key benchmark when evaluating government accountants’ 
performance has been their capability of realising the allocated budget to programmes and 
activities in a timely manner and of maintaining budgetary compliance. The majority of 
accountants mentioned that there are now broader and individual consequences if they fail to 
release or spend the allocated budget and maintain ‘budgetary compliance’. A potential risk is 
that the Ministry of Finance may question the significance of an annual budget increment to 
their concerned ministry and undertake budget cuts. Underspending may also lead to an 
adverse consequence in the performance appraisal of accountants. A junior accountant at the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD) remarked: 
 “The thing that is of concern to the Secretary and higher-level officers is not the results 
or outputs of public expenditure but spending the allocated money. If we fail to use the 
budget, it is likely that we will get less money next year. We may be labelled as being 
inefficient and ineffective in discharging our duty. Everyone will be impacted 
adversely. So we are morally responsible for helping us and the others to spend the 
allocated budget within a given time period.”  
 
The above statement is evidence that internal structures of Nepalese government accountants 
are shaped around the budget. As stated by Stones (2005), government accountants are aware 
of what the agents-in-context expect from them and the rewards and sanctions likely to 
follow from their actions. This understanding of government accountants has apparently 
become a factor which has led to many important provisions added into the accounting 
system/regulations in recent years becoming obsolete. For instance, there is a provision in the 
2007 Financial Administration Rules (FAR) (see Chapter 3) which requires government 
entities to report certain accrual items such as outstanding staff advances and suppliers not 
being paid until the next year (GoN, 2007). We noted during our interviews that not only the 
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non-gazetted and junior accountants, but also the senior accountants who are in charge of the 
Financial Administration Division are either unaware or neglecting the existing provisions of 
the accounting regulations. Their only concern has been to maintain the limits set out in the 
budget and discharge their accountability. A head of the FAD at the Ministry of Health 
(MoH), who had the opportunity to attend a postgraduate programme in public sector 
accounting abroad, remarked: 
 “Our system is actually a modified cash accounting system. However, there is no 
demand for other statements apart from the budget reports. Our internal audit and 
external audits are all meant to ensure budgetary compliance. The vast majority of 
higher-level officers at the FCGO and the ministries are unaware that we are also 
required to maintain reports of assets and liabilities using the accounting form no. 18.” 
 
We have observed that Nepalese government accountants are both knowledgeable and 
reflexive in their day-to-day activities. They are capable of making use of their social position 
in reproducing budget routines (i.e. budget execution and compliance), applying various 
codes of interaction, amongst others, non-compliance and manipulation of budget 
information. They have maintained a general disposition to ignore or manipulate many 
accounting provisions other than those relating to budget release and compliance. We were 
told during our interviews that the manipulation of government accounting and budgeting 
information has become the taken-for-granted practice in Nepal. Indeed, there are several 
weaknesses inherited to the accounting system contributing to promoting this culture. For 
instance, a senior account officer at the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development 
(MoFALD) remarked: 
“The performance of the projects and programmes embedded in the medium-term 
budget has been subjective in terms of the lack of accounting information. Our 
accounting system is not detailed enough to delineate the progress that has been made 
towards achieving the intended results. We have to manipulate the costs and results in 
order to ensure compliance.” 
 
The existing high degree of ‘trust’ amongst government accountants due to their social 
position has however played an important role in the pursuit of such manipulative culture and 
disposition. Government accountants’ conjuncturally-specific knowledge of the strategic 
terrain and in particular their ability to reflexively monitor the knowledge and social position 
of higher-level officers have further strengthened their capability to persist with this taken-
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for-granted manipulative practice (disposition). For instance, there is no such segregation 
amongst the administrators in the first class (higher-level) (PSC, 2007). This means when a 
senior accountant gets promoted, he/she will be automatically released from the accounting 
group and can be appointed as a higher-level officer in any ministry or department. 
Government accountants are aware of the fact that the majority of higher-level officers (first-
class officers) at the FCGO, who are assigned to scrutinise the ministerial statements, are 
from other disciplines than accounting and that they have limited knowledge of government 
accounting practices and of ongoing developments. This is evident in the following statement 
of a junior accountant serving at the FCGO: 
 “The new Joint Comptroller, I think he was from a revenue group, asked me to improve 
the system for recording advances in the MTEF projects, so as to make the transactions 
more transparent. I told him that transactions related to advances are not easy to 
categorise as they can be accommodated into five or six different budget items. He later 
gave up the idea and continued with the existing system.” 
 
We have also identified another factor, what Jayasinghe & Thomas (2009) have described as 
a lack of fear about the potential consequences, impacting the government accountants’ 
dispositions and conjuncturally-specific knowledge. As stated previously, over-politicisation 
has in recent years eroded a meritocracy in the Nepalese public administration (Dix, 2011). 
The issues such as promotion and transfer and reward and punishment of government 
accountants (as well as other administrators) are decided on the basis of ‘political connection 
and patronage’ and other corrupt mechanisms rather than on the basis of the performance 
appraisal undertaken by the FCGO and concerned ministries. This has provided many 
politically-oriented but incompetent administrators/officers with an opportunity to get 
promoted to a higher position (Askvik, Jamil, & Dhakal, 2010). A limited knowledge and 
understanding of government accounting has made these officers incapable of penalising 
their subordinates for any deviant practices, which has resulted in a situation of impunity 
(Ghimire, 2015). The manipulative culture is, however, seemingly widespread across all 
disciplines, not least in accounting and at all levels within the Nepalese public administration. 
Lacking capacity and competence, the higher-level officers therefore tend to establish a 
congenial relationship with junior staff members, and perpetuate their careers rather than 
jeopardise them by challenging them. Such is evident in the following statement of a junior 
accountant at the FCGO: 
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“They [the higher-level officers] do not want conflicts with the accountants. They know 
that the accountants, if they wish, can make their life difficult by disapproving the 
payments and delaying the reporting. I know I won’t be penalised for the manipulations 
of performance as long as I execute the allocated budget and maintain the accounts on a 
timely basis.” 
 
The above culture is envisaged as an addition to the bureaucratic tradition inherited from the 
history of Rana period, i.e. the shifting of personal responsibilities and the avoiding of 
decision-making (Dix, 2011). This reflects from the government accountants’ judgments in 
everyday accounting practice. Government accountants are involved in dialogues with the 
agents-in-context to perpetuate the budget routine and resist the proposed changes. As stated 
by Jack & Kholeif (2008), we have envisaged multiple dialectics of control in terms of 
resistance led to by the position–practice relations of accountants and the agents-in-context, 
which we will discuss in the next section. 
 
5.3. Active agency of government accountants (the agents-in-focus): contradictions and the 
dialectics of control in terms of resistance  
 
Active agency refers to those moments when the government accountants execute their 
everyday accounting practices and address reform ideas. It is seen as a result of a 
combination of government accountants’ conduct and context analysis and the interaction 
between their external and internal structures (Stones, 2005). There are apparently 
contradictions between government accountants and the agents-in-context in the process of 
executing everyday accounting and implementing changes due to their different social 
positions and knowledge of structures. For instance, that the government accountants’ day-to-
day routines are confined to budget implementation implies that any proposed changes, 
which have a focus other than budget implementation, are likely to contradict with their 
conjuncturally-specific internal structures. On the contrary, the agents-in-context have turned 
out to be pro-reformists due to their position–practices emphasising the changes in existing 
accounting and the relevance of the Cash-Basis IPSAS. We have observed during our 
interviews that government accountants are, however, aware of these various position-
practice relations and the conduct and context of these networked agents-in-context, and that 
their social position has offered them perceived power (or capability) to dominate these 
actors-in-context in the duality and dialectic of control. Multiple dialectic of control relations 
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have therefore been taking place in Nepalese central government accounting, which have 
resulted in the resistance to the externally-propagated changes.  
 
5.3.1. Contradictions between government accountants and administrators/higher-level 
officers 
 
The administrators and higher-level officers in the ministries and the FCGO are involved in 
executing the activities, programmes, and projects embedded in the budget, which they can 
carry on after the allocated budget is released to them from the Financial Administration 
Division (FAD). The position that they have inherited has exerted pressure on them to 
demonstrate the results and outcomes of budget expenditures, the realisation of which they 
argue would require the adoption of World Bank-propagated accounting discourses initiated 
at macro global level; for instance, the Cash-Basis IPSAS (Pradhan, 2013). Government 
accountants are therefore envisaged as a major obstacle in the articulation of these reforms. 
For instance, during our interviews, administrators and higher-level officers expressed their 
perceptions about government accountants and their interactions with them in implementing 
reforms. Not only are the accountants seen as outsiders in the ministry, the administrators and 
officers are of the view that they lack understanding of the bureaucratic procedures and the 
challenges involved in facilitating everyday administrative tasks. Implicit in the view of 
administrators and higher-level officers was the assertion that it is due to the hostile attitude 
of government accountants in embracing reforms that the problems of underspending, budget 
irregularities, and outstanding reimbursements have escalated in the country. An 
undersecretary at the MoF remarked: 
“We have to show results, but we do not have control over the resources. The budget is 
in the possession of accountants, and they always find reasons to delay the release of the 
budget. They have no idea about the operation of administrative mechanisms. Changes 
in accounting should go on so that we do not need to rely upon their discretion for 
spending.” 
 
Generating resistance has been reckoned to be both the strategy of the accountants to 
continue making other administrators reliant on them for resources (i.e. the budget), and a 
way to ensure their ontological security (Giddens, 1979, 1984) by avoiding a threat to their 
prevailing budget routines. A higher-level officer at the Ministry of Finance justified why 
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they exclude government accountants while undertaking a decision on issues relating to 
accounting reforms in the ministry at the meso level: 
 “In developing countries like Nepal, we first need to make reform decisions, and then 
only we can think of their implementation. If we start discussing with accountants, 
reforms will never be agreed. Government accountants are hostile to reforms, and if we 
start discussing with them whether we need reforms or not, agreement will never be 
reached.” 
 
We have observed that the government accountants are engaged, however, in the reflexive 
monitoring of position–practice relationships and conduct and context analysis in that they 
are aware of how the administrators and higher-level officers are likely to interpret their 
agency and intentions. First, they are aware of the fact that the higher-level officers and 
administrators, lacking basic accounting knowledge and understanding of the system, are 
mainly involved in negotiating with representatives of international organisations regarding 
the reforms. These officers are not familiar with the accounting problems that the government 
has encountered, are unaware of the available resources and infrastructure to instigate the 
World Bank-propagated reforms and lack an understanding of whether and how the adoption 
of reforms would lead to improvements in accounting practice. As a result, many government 
accountants have perceived that the implementation of reforms is nothing but just an 
additional burden to them. Commenting on the role of higher-level officers, a non-gazetted 
accountant at the FCGO stated: 
“They [the higher-level officers] undertake decisions regarding many accounting issues 
and reforms without our consent and even without informing us. They do not know our 
requirements and capacity because they are not involved in the practice. We know that 
such reforms decided by the officers are not applicable in Nepal. What is the point of 
implementing these reforms then?” 
 
Next, many government accountants are of the view that the higher-level officers and 
administrators are equally concerned over maintaining stability in cash accounting and the 
current way of operating the budget so as to maintain control over the accountants. As stated 
by Wildavsky (1972), mentions are made that the Nepalese administrators have always been 
reluctant to recognise accountants as financial managers, a designation which is specified in 
the regulations (GoN, 2007), and to delegate the authority and power allowing them to have a 
say in the selection of projects or programmes for the budget and the articulation of day-to-
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day public administration. Reforms such as the Cash-Basis IPSAS and accrual accounting, 
which call for more financial decision-making from accountants (Harun et al., 2012; Ashraf 
& Uddin, 2013, 2015), are therefore more likely to pose a threat to the administrators. During 
our interviews, a large number of government accountants pointed out a range of activities 
that the administrators and higher-level officers have used to undermine the reform 
initiatives, including their denial to allocate extra budget for training and software 
development and a refusal to amend the regulations so as to make the use of the international 
standards mandatory, amongst other things. These activities are seen as indicators reflecting 
the actual intention of the higher-level officers and administrators, which is to give continuity 
to the budgetary tradition. 
 
Implicit in the view of the government accountants was the assertion that the Cash-Basis 
IPSAS has proved to be a means for some higher-level officers and administrators at the 
Ministry of Finance and the FCGO to secure not only external legitimacy, but also additional 
benefits such as participation in training and seminars abroad. Such an attempt by higher-
level officers to personally exploit the benefits of World Bank-led reforms is evident also in 
other emerging economies (Uddin et al., 2011; Lassou & Hopper, 2016). Some of the 
government accountants have envisaged this motive of the higher-level officers and 
administrators as a reason why junior and senior accountants are excluded from the reform 
process. A senior accountant at the FCGO remarked: 
“Their [the higher-level officers and administrators] motive is just to impress 
international organisations and ensure their personal benefits. They accept any reforms 
proposed by international organisations. They also know that we [the accountants] 
would never accept any sort of reform that we could not achieve, such as accruals and 
accounting standards, so we are never invited to the meetings.” 
 
5.3.2. Contradictions between government accountants and professional accountants and 
international consultants 
 
We observed that government accountants, however, have such dialectic contradictions, not 
only with the higher-level officers and administrators but also with professional accountants, 
some of whom were employed as an international consultants in the past, in terms of the need 
of reforms and the manner in which these changes should be articulated. For instance, they 
have been reflexively monitoring the World Bank’s proposal of allowing the Accounting 
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Standards Board (ASB) to develop public sector accounting standards, and an attempt by the 
professional accountants and international consultants to echo the voice of the World Bank 
with regard to the importance of the Cash-Basis IPSAS, for the sake of ensuring the Bank’s 
financial support and justifying the expertise respectively. Government accountants are of the 
view that the Bank has forced the government to delegate the task of developing the Nepal 
Public Sector Accounting Standards corresponding to the Cash-Basis IPSAS to the ASB, 
which has neither any interest nor adequate concern over public sector accounting. The 
Bank’s intention has been to implement the standards without undertaking any major 
amendments to the content. Professional accountants and their institutes are therefore best 
suited to fulfil this objective given their competence in handling technical accounting issues. 
Claims are made that the actual intention of professional accountants in pursuing the reforms 
has been to exert their domination in the public sector by overpowering government 
accountants and to ensure their personal gains rather than to improve the system. Such 
motives of professional accountants in public sector accounting are evident also in other 
contexts (Ashraf & Uddin, 2013; Christensen, 2005). In commenting on the World Bank’s 
involvement, a senior accountant at the FCGO stated: 
“The World Bank should understand that government accounting is not the priority area 
of the ASB/ICAN. They just want to make the donors happy by forcing us to initiate 
reforms. In doing so, they would continue getting support in the name of implementing 
reforms. For instance, following the wishes of the Bank, the Board has altered a few of 
the wordings of the Cash-Basis IPSAS and handed it over to us for implementation. 
Had we been given the opportunity to develop the standards, we would have developed 
them in a way that represented our structure and requirements.” 
 
Similarly, government accountants are of the view that the consultants of the World Bank and 
other international organisations propagate reforms so as to demonstrate their expertise and 
promote the rhetoric of efficiency in resource allocation and management. A chartered 
accountant, however, who had previously worked as the World Bank’s local consultant in 
financial management, denied the assertion stating: 
“IPSAS can produce unique information about the performance of government 
policies, programmes, and projects. This information can be used to improve the 
management of public expenditures”.  
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During our interviews, the professional accountants also attempted to justify their actions by 
pointing to the attitude of government accountants and their conjuncturally-specific 
knowledge. The professional accountants are of the view that the bureaucratic mentality that 
the government accountants have institutionalised has eroded their innovativeness and 
adaptability to the new system, and that every actor propagating changes has appeared to 
them more as a threat. The Chairman of the ASB commented on the limited knowledge of 
government accountants and emphasised the involvement of chartered accountants in the 
reform process: 
“I have been trying to tell government accountants that accounting standards (IPSASs) 
are meant to improve the reporting mechanisms rather than to overhaul the entire 
system. The FCGO has, however, envisaged standards similar to their accounting 
regulations. Without the participation of professional accountants, the government 
accountants would not be able to address any technical issues emerging from the 
implementation of the standards.” 
 
5.3.3. Contradictions between government accountants and auditors 
 
In a similar vein, we noted during our interviews the prevalence of a duality and dialectic 
relationship between government accountants and auditors in implementing reforms. The 
auditors and the Auditor General’s Office (AGO) have inherited a distinct social position, i.e. 
a constitutional unit in Nepal. The office is entitled to receive the budget directly from the 
Ministry of Finance without parliamentary scrutiny and approval, and has delegated an 
authority to summon any government officials for any perceived misuse of public resources. 
Public expectations of the AGO include the control of budget irregularities, the effective use 
of public resources, and the maintenance of financial discipline (AGO, 2012, 2014). The 
auditors during our interviews have made a claim that they have embarked on substantial 
changes in the auditing sector in recent years to meet such expectations, which include, 
amongst others, the introduction of performance-oriented reporting, the recruitment of 
professional accountants, and the capacity development of staff members. Government 
accountants have been reproached, however, for giving continuity to the compliance-oriented 
accounting and undermining the relevance of the changes which they have undertaken. A 
senior auditor at the AGO remarked: 
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“Anyway, auditing comes after accounting. What is the point of introducing 
performance auditing when the focus of accounting is on compliance? The FCGO 
should not delay in embarking on the reforms.” 
 
As is the case with other actors-in-context, the reflexivity of government accountants is 
ostensible in maintaining the duality and dialogue with the auditors. The government 
accountants are strategically aware of the fact that despite the emphasis on performance and 
the results of public expenditures, the central focus of external auditing has been on detecting 
irregularities by examining whether or not the incurred expenditures are in accordance with 
the regulations. This is also evident in the annual audit reports issued by the AGO in which a 
greater emphasis has been placed on demonstrating the overall irregularities of the spending 
units and comparing them with previous years (AGO, 2012, 2014). The spending units’ 
success in recovering and curtailing irregularities based on accounting statements has 
ostensibly become the yardstick through which to measure their efficiency and competence in 
budget management. The auditors are apparently more concerned over the stability of 
existing government accounting and budgetary routines so as to maintain their positon-
practices with the government accountants. This is evident in the following statement made 
by a junior accountant at the FCGO: 
“The auditors do know that reforms in accounting will weaken their influence because 
this will require them to focus on performance rather than irregularities or 
noncompliance, which they will not be able to cope with given the infrastructure and 
manpower they possess. The Auditor General’s Office has not even approved our 
reporting formats based on IPSAS, and we cannot move on without their approval.” 
 
5.3.4. Contradictions between government accountants and politicians 
 
The government accountants are of the view that such rhetoric for the need of accounting 
changes are common amongst the agents-in-context. In reality, government accounting 
reforms have been envisaged by these agents more as a means of granting accountants more 
autonomy (power asymmetries) over the budget, which is evident in the following statement 
of a senior accountant at the FCGO: 
“They [the administrators and auditors] think accounting reforms will provide 
accountants with more power over resources and that they will be asked to report and 
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audit the performance and results of previous expenditures. That is why it is very 
difficult for any accounting reform to get approval, even though everyone says 
accounting should be changed.” 
 
All above-mentioned discussions resemble the findings of prior work suggesting that the 
accounting system, which is likely to weaken the positions of certain actors, often engenders 
resistance (Scapens & Roberts, 1993; Uddin & Tsameny, 2005). However, what we have 
realised during our interviews, which differentiates Nepal from other western countries with 
regard to adopting accounting changes, is the support of government politicians. Studies of 
western countries have alluded to a lack of political will and support as a major impediment 
to the acceptance of government accounting reforms (Carlin, 2005; Guthrie, 1998; Hyndman 
& Connolly, 2011). Although Nepalese government politicians (at ministerial level) have 
been reproached for their intervention in everyday accounting practice through promotions, 
transfers, and relocations of government accountants on the basis of political patronage and 
connection, the government accountants we interviewed claim that they have never been an 
obstacle to the acceptance of the proposed reforms at meso local level. The fact that they are 
concerned with gaining popularity within a short time span has led them to accept any change 
proposals without considering the pertinence of the changes, as well as the capacity of the 
country to accommodate such alterations. This attitude of government politicians has been 
claimed to be one reason why the country has been a pioneer in the context of emerging 
economies in adopting the World Bank-propagated reforms (Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2011). 
The dialogue between the government politicians and the government accountants is evident 
in the following statement made by a senior accountant at the FCGO: 
“I understand that government politicians are eager to declare reforms so as to garner 
public support. However, we are different because we need to go through all the 
procedures and regulations before adopting and implementing changes. It will not 
happen overnight as is wished by the politicians. If I were to adhere to what the 
politicians want, I would probably be accused of breaching the regulations. We have to 
refuse such politically oriented ideas.” 
 
5.4. Outcomes 
 
Outcomes, which are the result of active agency, encapsulate the effect of agency on 
structures leading to the latter being altered, reproduced, or preserved. In our case, we 
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observed that government accountants are under pressure to alter their day-to-day accounting 
practice and budget routines, and embrace proposed changes from higher-level officers, 
administrators, professional accountants, international consultants, auditors, and politicians. 
The very objectives and requirements of the proposed accounting measures, i.e. the Cash-
Basis IPSAS and accrual accounting, which call for a greater role of accounting beyond 
maintaining budgetary compliance, have remained ‘contradictory’, however, with the agency 
and praxis of government accountants as well as other agents-in-context. Multiple dialectics 
of control therefore exist between government accountants and other actors, the ultimate 
outcome of which has been the resistance of reforms and the reproduction of traditional 
budget routines.  
 
The progress achieved so far in implementing the Cash-Basis IPSAS adopted in 2009 perhaps 
serves as an illustration of the prevalence of such multiple dialectics of control in Nepalese 
government accounting. Despite the support of higher-level officers, administrators, 
professional accountants, auditors, consultants, and politicians, the adoption of the standard 
has not gone beyond its trial in some ministries in the last seven years, let alone been 
implemented across public entities in the country (FCGO, 2015; MoF, 2015). We argue that 
government accountants are dominating the position–power relations because of their 
capability in relation to other actors (i.e. power asymmetries in mobilising the budget), their 
trust between each other, and their knowledgeability in terms of the general dispositions and 
conjuncturally-specific knowledge of other actors. Through their conduct and context 
analysis of the agents-in-context, they know that all these pro-reformists in Nepalese 
government accounting are more concerned over either avoiding the delegation of additional 
authority to government accountants or ensuring the external resources (grants and aid). 
Propagating reforms has been their strategy to legitimise their position–practice relations. 
What they desire is to give continuity to the existing budget routines and to perpetuate their 
interest. Thus the case evidence has proved that at micro level the reforms have not been 
materialised, mainly because of the inability of the agents-in-context to make a considerable 
impact on the internal structures of the agents-in-focus (government accountants).    
 
6. Summary and conclusions  
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We have in the paper illustrated why’ and ‘how’ the routinised accounting practice is 
reproduced and the resistance to change is executed in the central government of Nepal. 
Nepal is often reckoned to be a front runner amongst emerging economies in terms of 
embracing the World Bank-led accounting discourses; for instance, accrual accounting and, 
more recently, the Cash-Basis IPSAS (Adhikari et al., 2013; Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2011). 
However, the very objectives of accounting (i.e. budget execution and compliance) and its 
fundamental principle (i.e. the cash principle) have remained intact and the reforms adopted 
have become merely rhetoric. Status quo in practice and resistance to reforms characterise 
Nepalese central government accounting. The use of SST has enabled us to focus beyond 
institutional analysis – which has dominated the extant public sector accounting literature in 
Nepal and other emerging economies (Adhikari and Mellemvik, 2011; Adhikari et al., 2013; 
Harun et al., 2012) – to agency, and to empirically illustrate the duality and a dialectic 
relation between government accountants (the agents-in-focus) and the agents-in-context at 
different ontological scales in everyday accounting practice. We are not aware of any studies 
on public sector accounting in emerging economies which have offered such an in-depth 
analysis of interactions and agency between government accountants (the agents-in-focus) 
and the agents-in-context as led to by their external and internal structures and their conduct 
and context analysis.  
 
In the paper, our first concern has been to unfold the reasons for the reproduction of routine 
government accounting practice at the ontic level. We have observed that significant 
differences exist between government accountants and the agents-in-context due to their 
position–practices. The position–practice relations of government accountants have been 
constructed by factors such as their formal separation from other bureaucrats and dual 
accountability being imposed on them. Their social position has led them to be perceived 
within a network of social relations as outsiders, and their identity has been constructed more 
as bookkeepers and budget compliers rather than financial advisors, an identity that the 
government accountants should hold according to the regulations (GoN, 2007). The 
separation from other groups has also offered possibilities to government accountants in that 
they are enabled to develop a high degree of trust and share similar dispositions and 
conjuncturally-specific knowledge amongst one other (Coad & Glyptis, 2014; Coad & 
Herbert, 2009; Moore & McPhail, 2016). Moreover, the power over budget (allocative 
resources), which they have inherited due to social position have made them capable of 
dominating the agents-in-context in the network of relations. 
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Our evidence has revealed that the general dispositions of government accountants have been 
confined to budget and its implementation. This is, however, not surprising given the fact that 
the main concern of Nepalese government accounting since its establishment in the 1960s has 
been to track budget expenditures, and that budget execution has continued to become a 
major issue/challenge in the country (Wildavsky, 1972; FCGO, 2015). Knowledge and 
capability are reckoned to be the two key sources, which enable the actors to reproduce their 
action (Stones, 2005). The findings of the study illustrate that government accountants are 
aware of the importance of executing budget and maintaining budgetary compliance given 
the knowledge of their social position and of the rewards and sanctions associated with 
spending the allocated budget. These internal structures are clearly reflected in their agency. 
They are also aware of the limited understanding of accounting amongst the higher-level 
officers and their incompetence in maintaining bureaucratic control due to political 
patronage. This knowledge has provided them with the opportunity to embrace various 
interpretative schemes; for instance, the non-compliance of those regulations not related to 
the budget and the manipulation of budget information, as part of perpetuating their day-to-
day budget routines.  
 
We have observed that the agency of Nepalese government accountants, as well as other 
agents, mainly the administrators and auditors (the agents-in-context), have continued to 
reflect the bureaucratic culture, which they had institutionalised during the Rana period; for 
instance, risk aversion and decision avoidance (Dix, 2011). Political patronage and 
connection have remained as the key determinants in the organisation of public 
administration. In addition, over-politicisation of public administration occurring in recent 
years has escalated impunity, which has demoralised government accountants in their day-to-
day praxis, but at the same time offered them further capacity in activating their agency; for 
instance, pursuing various manipulative schemes without the fear of the potential 
consequences (Jayasinghe & Thomas, 2009) and a greater strength in resisting changes.  
 
Government accounting reforms proposed over time, such as accrual accounting and the 
Cash-Basis IPSAS, have therefore been denied because the very objectives of these reforms 
have contradicted the dispositions, conjuncturally-specific knowledge, and agency of 
government accountants and undermined their ontological security (Giddens, 1979, 1984; 
Stones, 2005). The fact that such externally-propagated reforms are premised on the rhetoric 
of augmenting efficiency and transparency in public expenditure management implies that 
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they are not limited to executing the budget, a key concern of government accountants. The 
proposed reforms have posed government accountants a threat in the continuity of budget 
routines. 
 
Our next concern in the study has been to investigate how the proposed government 
accounting changes are resisted. We have observed that although the higher-level officers, 
administrators, professional accountants, and auditors have acted as pro-reformists, 
government accountants are aware of their conjuncture and intentions through their conduct 
and context analysis, which range from controlling accountants to optimising organisational 
and personal benefits by impressing international organisations. Implicitly, some of these 
actors-in-context are more concerned over retaining the budget practices so as to ensure and 
maintain their existing position-practices and resources. This is evident in their day-to-day 
practice; for instance, the failure to sanction additional funds for facilitating training on the 
IPSAS (by higher-level officers and administrators) and denying the endorsement of the 
IPSAS forms and manuals (by auditors). The continuous reiteration of the need for reforms, 
however, has been their strategy to legitimise their position-practices. We argue that 
differences and contradictions between the clusters of agents have instigated duality and 
dialectic relationships between them. Multiple dialectics of control in terms of resistance are 
evident in Nepal, which have resulted in the reproduction of everyday government 
accounting practices and resistance to the World Bank-led reforms. 
 
The extant literature in public sector reforms in emerging economies shows that resisting 
internationally-propagated reforms is not an easy endeavour in that such changes are often 
imposed to host countries as a precondition of financial and technical support (Neu et al., 
2009; Neu & Ocampo, 2007; Rahaman & Lawrence, 2001). In addition, incentives and 
tangible benefits are offered to policy makers and higher-level officers in emerging 
economies for the acceptance of public sector accounting reforms (Uddin et al., 2011). This 
has resulted in some emerging economies in the abandonment of their well-functioning 
accounting and budgeting systems (Lassou and Hopper, 2016). Attempts of international 
organisations to disseminate neo-liberal reforms, which government accounting is part of, 
have therefore drawn critics, and questions have been raised as to what extent such reforms 
are optimal in the context of emerging economies (Lehman, 2005; Graham & Neu, 2003; 
Stiglitz, 2000). We have in this paper offered further empirical evidence to support such 
critiques. Indeed, Nepal’s political willingness to embrace the World Bank-led government 
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accounting reforms may not be a surprise. However, what is striking in the context of Nepal 
is that the implementation of such reforms has been resisted at the ontic level by government 
accountants and the agents-in-context. Government accountants and the agents-in-context are 
blaming each other in their dialectic relations for the failure to implement the proposed 
changes, and in the process the stability in accounting practice has remained intact in the 
country. 
 
We believe that Stones’ (2005) SST has helped us enrich our understanding of central 
government accounting in Nepal, incorporating both the practices and changes. Our main 
empirical contribution in the paper has been an in-depth analysis of agency and structures – 
in particular external structures – in everyday government accounting practice in emerging 
economies, issues that have been under-represented in the extant public sector accounting 
literature. We have offered an additional insight into why accounting reforms fail in the 
public sector of emerging economies and how actors in different position-practice 
relationships and at different levels of the ontological scale battle against others to resist such 
externally proposed changes. We argue that such a holistic understanding of government 
accounting practice and reforms at the ontic level in emerging and less-developed countries is 
paramount at present given that so much effort and resources, which could otherwise be used 
in other more important purposes, for instance, alleviating poverty, are being spent in the 
reconstruction of public sector accounting and accountability.  
 
We have also addressed the call to apply ST in empirical accounting research (Englund and 
Gerdin, 2014; Makrygiannakis and Jack, 2016) and SST in the study of accounting in 
emerging economies and in the context of public sector (Jack & Kholeif, 2008; Coad & 
Glyptis, 2014; Elmassri et al., 2016; Feeney & Pierce, 2016). More importantly, as 
emphasised in prior SST-based literature (Coad et al., 2015 and 2016), we have in this study 
moved beyond the static use of the quadripartite framework and further exploited  the 
potential of SST by supplementing it with the ideas of conduct and context analysis and 
following its methodological prescriptions. This has helped us develop a further insight into 
the dialectics of control in terms of resistance. We have in this manner not only demonstrated 
the way SST can be applied in the empirical study of public sector accounting in emerging 
economies, but also contributed to extending the scope of SST for further research.  
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To sum up, we would like to emphasis that public administration in most of the emerging and 
less-developed countries is centred on an annual budget (Allen, 2009), and government 
accountants hold a powerful position due to their role in executing budget and maintaining 
compliance. It is rather unlikely that any externally-propagated reforms would be 
implemented successfully in emerging economies without changing the emphasis on budget, 
and without a shift towards the agency of government accountants and other actors, which is 
also constructed on the day-to-day budgetary practices. The central government accounting in 
Nepal is just one illustration in this regard. The fact that emerging and less-developed 
countries have a unique historical and structural construction of active agency and 
government accounting practices (Alawattage et al., 2007) means that the use of social 
theories such as strong structuration in the study of public sector accounting in other 
emerging economies is of utmost importance. For instance, there is scope for further studies 
to unfold multiple dialectics of control as observed in the present study from the perspectives 
of the agents-in-context. This may not only assist day-to-day public sector accounting 
practices and ongoing reforms in emerging economies, but also to realise the full potential of 
strong structuration theory research in public sector accounting. 
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Appendix A. Distribution of our interviewees 
 
Interviewees Position of 
interviewees 
Interviewees’ offices March/April 
2014 
August 
2015 
 
Joint 
comptrollers 
and joint 
secretaries 
First-class or 
Higher-level 
officers/admini
strators 
The Financial Comptroller 
General Office (FCGO) and 
different ministries (mainly 
the Ministry of Health 
(MoH),  the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), the Ministry 
of Education (MoE), and the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs 
and Local Development 
(MoFALD) 
4  
Senior and 
junior 
government 
accountants 
Gazetted or 
officer-level 
government 
accountants 
The FCGO, the District 
Treasury and Controller 
Offices (DTCOs), and the 
Financial Administration 
Division (FAD) (within the 
MoF, the MoH, the MoE, and 
the MoFALD)  
14 4 
First, second, 
third, and 
fourth class 
government 
accountants   
Non-gazetted 
or non-officer 
level 
government 
accountants  
The FCGO, the DTCOs, and 
the FAD (within the MoF, the 
MoH, the MoE, and the 
MoFALD) 
5 1 
Officers  Administrators
/under-
secretaries/bur
eaucrats 
 The MoF, the MoH, the 
MoE, and the MoFALD 
10  
Auditors  Senior and 
junior auditors 
Auditor General’s Office 
(AGO) 
4  
Professional 
accountants 
and 
international 
consultants 
Chartered 
accountants 
(CA) 
The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nepal (ICAN) 
and the Accounting Standards 
Board (ASB) 
3 (Two of the 
interviewed CA 
had previously 
worked as a 
consultant for 
the World Bank 
and the Asian 
Development 
Bank in their 
public finance 
reform projects  
 
 
 
